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SPLIT TRIALS AND TIME SAVING:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS t
Hans Zeisel * andThomas Callahan**
In r959 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois adopted a rule permitting separate trials of liability and
damage issues in civil cases. At the request of the court the authors
have conducted an investigation to determine the extent to which
time is saved through use of the separation device. They use a
variety of converging statistical approaches to arrive at the conclusion that in personal injury jury trial cases about twenty per cent
of trial time may be saved. They then consider the possible ways
that separation might lengthen trial time, and conclude that these
will not offset the time saving to any degree.

Among the devices aimed at reducing the trial load of our
courts, the split or separate trial of issues has been proposed as
holding special promise. Trial time would be saved, the argument
goes, if the issues of liability and damages were tried separately.
The jury would be required first to bring in a verdict on liability,
and only if liability were found would the jury hear evidence and
render a second verdict on the issue of damages.' On the recommendation of the late Judge Julius H. Miner,2 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was persuaded
to test this device, and on November 3, 1959, adopted civil rule
2 1, set forth below,' permitting separate trial on motion of a party
t We are happy to acknowledge the generous support of this study by the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law. This investigation, an offshoot of the
University of Chicago Law School's prior work on the jury system and court
congestion, was conducted in closest collaboration with Professor Harry Kalven,
Jr., Director of the Jury Project.
"'Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Chicago Law School. Dr. jur.,
University of Vienna, 1927, Dr. rer. pol., 1928.
• *Third-year student, University of Chicago Law School; Research Assistant,
Jury Project, since 1957. M.A., University of Chicago, I962.
' Such a plan was proposed in ZEIsEL, KALV , & BUCHHOZ, DELAY iN THE
CouRT 99 (igg) [hereinafter cited as DELAY].
2 Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.J. 1265, 1268 (1959).
Judge Miner died on March ix, 1963, the very day this report was submitted to
his court. The cause of court administration, and especially its students, owe him
a great debt of gratitude for his determined efforts to pioneer what promises to be
a uniquely powerful delay remedy.
' N.D. IiL. (Civ.) R. 21, set forth in 2 FED. RuLES SERV. 2D 1048-49 (196o):
Pursuant to and in furtherance of Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to curtail undue delay in the administration of justice in personal injury
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or at the direction of the court. Though the rule was sponsored in
order to save trial time, a commodity in short supply in most metropolitan courts, attempts were soon made to upset it on the
ground that this major departure from the traditional mode of
trial might affect the substance of the verdicts rendered by juries.
But the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the rule
preserved the essential character of trial by jury and was within
the ambit of Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which permits separated trial of issues in the interest of convenience. 4
Prior to the promulgation of the rule, Chief Judge Campbell
asked the Law School of the University of Chicago to design a research operation that would measure the effect of separation on
the trial load of the court.' A later report may deal with the
above-mentioned substantive considerations; the present report
treats only of one aspect of the rule - its impact on trial time.
The way in which separation of issues may save court time is
clear. In the traditional form of trial, the damage issue must be
litigated even where the verdict will ultimately reject liability;
separation would eliminate the need for trying the damage issue in
those cases, comprising roughly 40 per cent of all personal injury
jury trials. 6 Even where liability was affirmed, it seemed likely
and other civil litigation wherein the issue of liability may be adjudicated as
a prerequisite to the determination of any or all other issues, in jury and
non-jury cases, a separate trial may be had upon such issue of liability, upon
motion of any of the parties or at the Court's direction, in any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim or third-party claim.
In the event liability is sustained, the Court may recess for pre-trial or
settlement conference or proceed with the trial on any or all of the remaining
issues before the Court, before the same jury or before another jury as conditions may require and the Court shall deem meet.
The Court, however, may proceed to trial upon all or any combination
of issues if, in its discretion, and in furtherance of justice, it shall appear that
a separate trial will work a hardship upon any of the parties or will result in
protracted or costly litigation.
' Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. x96o), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (i96i). The court did not decide whether the use of different juries for
liability and damage issues as authorized by the district court rule violates the
seventh amendment. The district court has confined the operation of rule 21 to
single juries. Cf. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., E83 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.
Ill.
i96o).
IThroughout the study Judges Campbell, Miner, and Robson acted as advisers,
for which we owe them a great debt of gratitude. We also want to thank the other
members of the court and its clerks for their meticulous help throughout these two
years. We are especially indebted to Mr. Roy Johnson, Special Assistant to Judge
Campbell, and to Miss Aileene C. Coldby, Chief Deputy Clerk, for their untiring
cooperation. Appreciation is also due to Mr. Orin S. Thiel and Mr. Ronald H.
Beatty of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for their thoughtful help in supplying us with a series of control statistics from their office.
0 From a nationwide sample of civil jury trials, which forms part of the basic
data of the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School.
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that trial time might be saved by the stimulus to settlement
before the damage issue is litigated. There remained, however, the
possibility that these savings might well be offset by a number of
countervailing factors not so immediately obvious. Thus the
separation of issues might reduce the proportion of cases settled,
and thereby increase the number of cases requiring trial. It might
reduce the ratio of jury waivers and thereby add to the number of
cases requiring jury trial.7 Separation might increase the proportion of hung juries, and necessitate more retrials. Finally, it might
simply require more time of juries overall, since in some cases
there would be two deliberations. The crucial question for this
study was, therefore, not so much whether but rather how much
time would be saved by the separation of issues.
Because our inquiry was set up only shortly before the adoption of the separation rule, we were unable to acquire data on the
period before the rule which we should have wished to have in
order to compare the operations of the court before and after the
separation rule was introduced. Instead, for our prior control
period we had to rely for information on data routinely collected
by the statistical branch of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. The ideal research design would have combined
such a prior observation period with a selection by chance of the
cases to which the separation rule would be applied. Specifically,
one might have subjected every three successive cases filed to a
sort of lottery: in the case drawn first, separation would be required; in the second, separation would not be allowed; in the
third case, separation would be left to the judge's discretion.
These groups of three would be assigned in rotation, giving each
judge an equal number of cases of each variant. After final disposition, the separated, the regular, and the cases where separation was discretionary would be compared and measured against
the period that preceded the introduction of the rule. But this
division of cases was of course not feasible for a variety of good
reasons." Instead, all that could be done was to keep a careful
record of the court's actions in each case from assignment to final
disposition, both for cases in which there was separation and for
the regular trials. We had no influence and of course did not attempt to exert any influence on the choice of cases in which the
'The New York experience showed that roughly 40
less time is used up in a
bench trial. DELAY 81.
' Cf. The Case for the Official Experiment, DELAY 241-50; Zeisel, The New
York Expert Testimony Project: Some Reflections on Legal Experiments, 8 STANi.
L. REV. 730, 741-48 (x956).
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issues were separated. Each judge applied the broad discretion
conferred on him by the rule according to his own understanding
of its suitability for the case at hand.
I
To begin the analysis, then, we present a synopsis of the civil
cases tried before the court. Table i gives the proportion of cases
tried under the separation rule in each category. The table shows
that the relative frequency of such trials varies greatly with the
type of action. Two categories show no separation whatsoever:
admiralty cases and tort cases other than personal injury claims.
The greatest use of separation was made in personal injury trials:
here 37 per cent of the jury cases and 27 per cent of the bench
trials were tried under the separation rule. Separation was ordered
TABLE 1
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF SEPARATED TRIALS BY TYPE OF CASE a
Regular Trials

Personal Injury:

b

Jury
Nonjury

Separated Trials

Number

Number

117

69

22

8

Percentage
of Total

37%
277%o

TOTAL

186
30
216

Other Tort:

Jury
Nonjury

io

I0

4

4
14

Contract:

Jury

19

24%

25

Nonjury

17

11%0

'9

44
Federal Tort
Claims Act:

Nonjury

Admiralty:

Jury

I

Nonjury

6

Other:

TOTAL:

10

Jury
Nonjury

8
34

Jury
Nonjury

155
93

4

248

29%

4

I%

75

33%

i8

x6%
93

'4

230

iiI

27%

341

'For the two-year period after introduction of rule 21 (i96o-i96i).
b Includes i6 jury and 6 nonjury FELA cases, of which one jury trial was
separated.
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in only one out of twenty-two FELA cases but in 29 per cent of
the fourteen Federal Tort Claims Act cases. These frequencies
forced us to limit our inquiry to personal injury cases: only this
category provided a sufficiently large group of separated (69) and
regular (117) trials to offer an adequate basis for statistical comparison. It would be improper to compare, for instance, separated
tort cases with nonseparated contract cases, since the validity of
any comparison requires that the cases be kept as homogeneous
as possible. Strictly speaking, therefore, conclusions of the study
will apply only to personal injury jury cases, but within reason
they should prove applicable also to other types of cases.
Table 2 proceeds to the comparison of separated and regular
personal injury trials. The i86 trials by jury during the observation period are divided by the stage at which they terminated.
We distinguish four stages for the separated trials and four
roughly parallel stages for the regular trials. The midpoint
for the regular trial comes at the end of the plaintiff's case; for
the separated trial, at the end of the liability trial.

STAGES

OF DISPOSITION

TABLE 2
TimmEREQUIRED To

AND

Regular Trials

Separated Trials
Days

Stage of Disposition

During Liability
Trial
At End of Liability
Trial
During Damage
Trial
After Full Trial
Average All
Cases
Number of Cases

i. 9
3.2

3.6
4.0

3.1

REACH THEA, a

Per Cent

Stage of Disposition

Days

During Plaintiff's
2.0
Case
I9%
At End of Plaintiff's
3-3
Case
62 %
During Defendant's
Case
4%
4.7
i5% After Full Trial
Average All
4.2
Cases
I00%
(69)

Number of Cases

Per Cent

i8%
4%

78%

100%

(117 )

Personal injury jury trials. Only court time is considered; deliberation time is
not included. Figures in the "Days" column are averages for cases disposed of at
the stage indicated.

It was, to repeat, the expectation of those who favored the
new rule that many separated trials would end after the liability
verdict, thus making the damage trial unnecessary. As can be
seen, Table 2 vividly confirms this expectation: fully 78 per cent
of the regular trials, but only I5 per cent of the separated trials,
go through their full course. And since many more regular trials
run their full course than do separated trials, it must be expected
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1610 1962-1963
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that the average trial time for each is quite different. The figures
for trial time in Table 2 bear this out, showing that the average
regular trial lasts 4.2 days, the separated trial, 3.1 days - a time
difference of 26 per cent. It would be tempting to read this figure
as the looked-for measure of the time saved by separation. Unfortunately, it cannot be accepted at face value because, standing
by itself, this comparison of the separated and the regular trials
could be quite misleading.
II
At this point we ask for the reader's indulgence during a somewhat complicated methodological excursion that will, we trust,
make clear why without further investigation we cannot trust
the comparison made by Table 2. The precise question is this:
Were the cases selected for separated trial and the cases left for
regular trial substantially similar except for the fact of separation?
If they were, we may attribute the observed difference to the fact
of separation. But if they were not, we are in trouble. It is the
same methodological problem that came to the fore in the now
famous debate over whether smoking shortens our life expectancy.
The average age at which smokers die is lower than that of nonsmokers, just as the average separated trial is shorter than the
average nonseparated one. Does such a statistic prove that smoking shortens life, or that separation shortens trial time? Suppose
it is the man who is less healthy to begin with who takes up smoking. We would then falsely attribute to smoking the effect of
shortening our lifetime, when in fact the average smoker had
a shorter life expectancy even before he began smoking. Similarly, one may find that deaths are more likely to occur in the near
future in families recently visited by physicians than in those unattended. Obviously it is not the doctor, but the preexisting situation that calls for a doctor, which causes the higher mortality
rate. A similar difficulty may apply to the figures in Table 2:
cases selected for separate trial might be different to begin with.
If that difference is itself related to the time saving we want
measured, then we no longer know to what extent the apparent
time saving was due to differences other than separation. That
was why our ideal research design specified selection by lot by avoiding purposeful selections we could avoid the possibility
of selections on some basis which might have a bearing on trial
time.
Were our separated trials selected in any way that could lessen
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1611 1962-1963
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the validity of the comparison in Table 2? We know that there
was purposeful selection by the judges. Though we do not know
the basis for their selection, a few statistics give us warning.
From Table 2, we see that the average separated trial which actually went to the jury on the damage question took 4.o days; but
it took considerably longer - 4.7 days - to try the regular cases
that ran their full course.' There is thus some indication, though
no proof, that the cases differ by selection. There is no proof,
because the figure for separated trials is based on only a small
fraction of cases that go the full course; the potentially longer
cases might well have been disposed of during trial. On this view
the difference would disappear if all trials were full trials.
Further, the figures in Table 3 suggest that the two groups of
cases were not selected at random. Only 34 per cent of the regular trials ended in favor of the defendant, in contrast to 56 per
cent of the separated trials - a figure far above the average. 1° Note
too that the proportion of directed verdicts is larger in the separated group. Finally, there is evidence that the regular trials left
over after some cases have been removed for separated trials
differ as a group from the run of regular trials before civil rule
21, when no cases were separated. Statistics supplied us by the
statistical branch of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts indicate that of the 196 personal injury jury trials conducted in this court during the two years prior to the introduction
TABLE 3
OUTCOME AND MODE OF TERMINATION OF SEPARATED AND

REGULAR TRIALS a
Separated Trials

Regular Trials

Mode of Termination

Per Cent

Per Cent

Settlement
Jury Verdict for Plaintiff
Total in Favor of Plaintiff
Jury Verdict for Defendant
Directed Verdict for Defendant
Total in Favor of Defendant
Number of Trials

32

24

1

12

42

66

44
43

3'
3

13

56
(69)

34
(ii)

Personal injury jury trials.

9

The trial times for the regular cases are somewhat high compared with statistics available from other courts, but there are no grounds for suspecting that this
should restrict the validity of our findings. We are concerned only with the relative trial time of separated and regular trials, and this relation should not be
affected by the generally longer trial time.
20 See note 6 supra.
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1612 1962-1963
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of rule 21, only 62 per cent of the cases went to a jury verdict,
as against 73 per cent " of the regular trials after rule 2 1. This
is another suggestion that judges might have been more likely
to order separate trial for those cases which held a promise of
not going through a full trial.
III

So much for the potential infirmities of the data in Table 2. Do
our data permit us to move the analysis to more secure ground?
Table 4 will show the proportion of personal injury jury trials
tried by each judge under the separation rule: the ratio varies
from 89 per cent for Judge A down to zero for Judges K and L.
Though this varying use seems at first blush unfortunate, it is
this very variation which will help to solve the problem. For
clarification, we return to the smoking analogy. Just as we could
not dictate when judges were to use split-trial procedure, we could
not select youngsters at random, ordering one group to smoke
and another not to. But we can expose one random group of
smokers to "stop-smoking" propaganda and keep another random
group of smokers as a control group, unexposed to this propaganda. We could then compare the longevity of the "exposed"
group with that of the control group. Any difference could be
attributed to the "stop-smoking" campaign.
Let us try to see more precisely how this analytical procedure
bypasses the difficulty that the decision to stop smoking will not
be made at random, but more likely by persons who are in some
way special with respect to smoking and with respect to health
in general. The point is that in this design we neither know nor
need to know how the self-selection works.
Let us assume the worst possible case from the point of view
of selection bias: suppose the only smokers who respond to the
stop-smoking campaign were those who started smoking only recently and who are at the same time particularly health conscious.
Let us assume also that it is only their lengthened life span which
would cause the average life span of the exposed group to increase. Even this extreme self-selection would in no way affect
the validity of the proposition that reduced smoking increases
life expectancy. The reason we would not be concerned with this
self-selection is that we know that in the control group, too, there
would be these health-conscious smokers who only recently began
to smoke, in about the same proportion as they occurred in the
1 Table 3, second column: 42 + 3 1 = 73.
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1613 1962-1963
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experimental group. And we should not care if some of the control group stopped smoking on their own, without exposure to
the propaganda. For it is quite sufficient to know that, whatever
the control group does, the experimental group also does, in addition to the experimental group's reaction to the stop-smoking campaign.
Now instead of two groups of smokers, let us take two groups
of trials, one conducted by Judge X who separates some of his
trials, and one by Judge Y who separates none. Since the court
assigns cases at random, the two groups of trials will be comparable. The only differences between the groups will be that
there was separation in one but not in the other, and conceivably
the differing expeditiousness of Judges X and Y. If the latter
factor is discounted, and if the average trial length in the group
of cases where separation sometimes occurred is below that of
the cases where it was not available, we are justified in ascribing
this difference to the separation. One would then expect Judges
K and L, who held no separate trials, to show a higher average
length of all their trials than Judge A, who separated in 89 per
cent of his trials. In reality, of course, there are not two judges,
but several judges, each having a different propensity to separate.
We should, therefore, expect this proposition to hold true: the
larger the proportion of separated trials for the particular judge,
TABLE 4
SEPARATION RATIO AND AVERAGE TRIAL TimE
IN PERSONAL INJURY JURY TRIALS

Judge

A

Proportion of Cae
Tried Under Rule 2i
(Per Cent)

Average Length of
All Trials Before
This Judge
(Days)

Number of
Trials Before
This Judge

89
51

3.2

(26)

B

3.3

(41)

C

50

2.3

D

38

(io)
(26)

E

29

F
G

20

3.5
6.1
5.6

17

4.2

(6)

H

14

(22)

a

(7)
(5)

J

7
7

3.8
3-9
4.3

K

0

4.5

(I)

L

0

4-5

(I)

I

(27)

(14)

It might be relevant to reveal that Judge A was not Judge Miner, the proponent of the rule.
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1614 1962-1963

1963]

SPLIT TRIALS AND TIME SAVING

1615

the shorter the average length of all his trials. In our case, we
should expect Judges A and B, who have the highest separation
rates, to show lower average trial lengths for all their trials than
Judges I, J, K, and L. Table 4 presents the pertinent statistics.
It is as we expected: as the separation ratio increases, the average
trial length decreases. The exact nature of this relationship becomes even clearer if we put Table 4 into graph form as in Table 5.
TABLE 5
PER CENT SEPARATION AND TRIAL

TimE

Average Trial Time'

K

(days)

0

111

20

40

60

80

100

Per Cent Separation
Judges with 14 cases or fewer b
* Judges with more than 14 cases b

0
b

In all personal injury jury trials, whether separated or not.
Judges are identified by letter as they appear in Table 4.

Generally, Table 5 shows a band of dots sloping downward
toward the right-hand borderline and thus confirms our expectation that the average trial length decreases as the proportion of
separate trials per judge increases. As will be noted, the individual
points representing the various judges are far from forming one
line which would represent the relationship between separation
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1615 1962-1963
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and trial length; they show great individual differences. These
differences derive from two causes. First, from the fact that
some judges will try their cases more expeditiously than others;
if so, their "points" will lie somewhat lower than they would if
they tried their cases at average speed. Second, from the fact
that, although cases are assigned to the judges at random, some
judges will be assigned more time-consuming cases than others.
The distorting effects of both these factors are automatically reduced to the extent that the number of judges (points) grows,
so that the "slower" and "faster" ones balance each other - provided that there is no consistent correlation between "fast" judges
and their propensity to separate."2 The distorting factors are also
reduced to the extent to which the individual judges have more
cases and hence are likely to have on balance the same average
assortment of long and short cases. In line with this reasoning,
we will disregard all judges who had less than fifteen cases. If
we then look at the five remaining Judges, I, H, D, B, and A, we
find them to fall nicely about the straight line we have drawn
in Table 5.13 The two crucial points along this line are its beginning and its end. It begins (at separation zero) with 3.8 days and
ends at the right-hand margin (separation ioo per cent) at 3.0
days. This line, the much-looked-for unbiased estimate, suggests
that if the court had tried all its personal injury jury cases under
the separation rule, it would have saved o.8 days out of 3.8 days,
or 2 1 per cent of the total trial time.

IV
An additional table provides further insights into the means by
which time is saved through the separation process: Table 6
compares the stage and mode of termination of regular and separated trials. The figures from Table 2, telling us at what stage
the cases terminate, form the right-hand margin column of Table
6; those from Table 3, mode of disposition, form the last lines for
regular and separated trials.

11 There

is, in fact, no assurance that such a correlation does not exist. A

sufficient number of nonjury trials for each judge, or adequate statistics on his
trial time prior to rule 21, might provide a clue. In this important respect, then,
this analysis deviates from a controlled experiment with its concomitant reassurance
that no systematic bias interfered with the result.
"' If the line were based on all 12 judges, irrespective of their number of trials,
it would show a somewhat steeper slope; that line would signify greater potential
savings than the present one. The context of this analysis, however, gives us good
reason to believe that the present line is likely to be closer to the "true line" that
would emerge from a controlled experiment.
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1616 1962-1963
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TABLE 6
STAGE AND MODE OF DIsPOSITION OF PERSONAL INJURY JURY TRIALS
Verdict for
Defendant

Stage of
Termination

Directed
Verdict

Settled

Jury
Verdict

Jury Verdict
for Plaintiff
on Liability
and Damages

TOTAL

A. Regular Trials
During Plaintiff's
Case

i8%

..

..

i8%

..

At End of Plaintiff's
Case
3%
During Defendant's
Case

%

..

After Full Trial
Total

4%

....

..

3%
24%

2%

31%

3%

42%

31%

78%

42%

100%a

B. Separated Trials

During Liability
Trial

1oc

9%

....

15 %d

4%

43%

19%

At End of Liability
Trial

--

62

During Damage
Trial
4% d
After Full Damage
Trial
3%0d
32%
Total
£117

4%
...

12%

13%

43%

12%

I%

100% b

trials.

b69 trials.

'Settled before jury returned any verdict.
d

Settled after jury verdict affirming liability but before jury returned verdict

on damages. These cases, totaling 22 per cent (15 + 4 + 3), represent those in

which the jury found for the plaintiff on liability but never deliberated on the
question of damages.

If we look first at regular trials, we see that 18 per cent of all
regular trials were terminated through settlement during the plaintiff's case, and that settlement at a later stage is much less frequent. Then we turn to the figures for separated trials. Here we
see confirmed our hypothesis that the bulk of cases disposed of
at the end of the liability trial terminate in a verdict denying liability: of the 62 per cent terminating at that point, 47 or roughly
three-fourths, end with verdicts for the defendant. But the unexpected element concerns those cases in which the jury finds
for the plaintiff on the issue of liability. We find an increased willingness on the part of defendants to settle once they have lost the
liability issue. Fifteen per cent of all trials end through settlement after the jury affirms liability, another 4 per cent are settled
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1617 1962-1963

1618

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:i6o6

during the damage trial, and 3 per cent at the end of the damage
trial. Thus, of the (i5 + 4 + 3 + 12 =) 34 per cent of all
cases where the jury finds for the plaintiff, only 19 per cent reach
a trial on the damage issue and only 12 per cent, or about onethird, reach a second jury verdict. In short, separation may save
trial time, not only in cases ending in defendants' verdicts but in
cases resulting in plaintiffs' verdicts as well. Once liability is
affirmed these cases too are very likely to be settled and, hence,
will benefit from separation of the issues.
These figures explain why it would be so difficult to predict at
the time of separation which cases are likely to benefit from it.
A prediction that the case is likely to end for the defendant is not
enough, because the cases that go for the plaintiff on liability also
are likely to benefit from separation. To select effectively, the
judge would have to be able to identify in advance the two groups
of cases that will not benefit from separation. These are (i) the
15 per cent of cases which go through a full trial despite separation, and (2) those cases whose early termination, though after
the liability trial, cannot be credited to separation, since they
would have ended prematurely through settlement or directed
verdict even if they had been tried regularly. The first two figures
in the right-hand column of Table 6, adding up to (i8 + 4 =) 22
per cent, are a measure of the frequency of these cases. We now
appreciate why Tables 2 and 5 come out so similarly. The "purposeful" selection by the judge is, at least with respect to the
expected time saving, not too different from a selection by lottery.
V
Now we may consider a third approach to the problem of estimating how much time is saved by the separation procedure. It
is clear that the entire time saving comes from avoiding the litigation of damages, either in cases where liability is rejected, or in
cases which are settled after liability is affirmed. We can then
roughly estimate the time saved if we know three items: The proportion of trials that go their full course to verdict if separation
is not available, the proportion of separated trials that go the full
course to a second verdict, and the share which litigation of damages constitutes of the total litigation time in a full trial. We
know the first percentage to be 62 per cent; '" from Table 6 we
14 According to data furnished us by the Administrative Office of the United

States Courts, in the two-year period prior to the introduction of civil rule
62% of personal injury jury trials went to a jury verdict.
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learned that only 12 per cent '5 of the separated trials went to a
second verdict. This means that separation causes about (62 12 =) 50 per cent of the trials to terminate without running
their full course. As to the share of total litigation time devoted
to the damage issue, we must rely on expert estimates, although
theoretically one could produce an actual time count on a representative sample of trials. Conversations with judges and lawyers
have led us to conclude that on the average the damage issue constitutes at the most 40 per cent of the total trial time. Armed
with these figures, we can perform the following computation:
If each of the roughly 5o per cent of the cases in which litigation
of damages is avoided involves a saving of 40 per cent of trial
time, then the saving from separation would amount to 20 per
cent of the total trial time. This result, in spite of the roughness
of its basis, is close enough to our other findings to permit now the
firm generalization that in personal injury jury trials separation
saves trial time of the magnitude of about 20 per cent.

VI
An important limitation should now be noted on the amount of
time which courts may actually save through the separation device. All calculations so far are based on the assumption that all
cases would be tried under the separation rule. But, as Table i
indicated, in this court only 37 per cent of the personal injury
trials are separated, and hence the time saved thereby is not 20
per cent but only 37 per cent of this 20 per cent, that is (.37 X
20 =) 7.4 per cent of the total trial time. We also know, however, from Table 4, that this average of 37 per cent is not the
same for all judges. We know from conferences with Judge A,
who had 89 per cent of his trials separated, that he ordered separation as a matter of routine, unless cause was shown as to why
separation should not be ordered. Judges I and J, on the other
hand, apparently proceeded with regular trials unless a special
reason was advanced for ordering separation. We would conclude, therefore, that io per cent is a good enough estimate of the
proportion of cases which, under the most liberal application of
"CIn addition, 3%5 of the separated cases were settled after a full trial. We do
not include these cases in the figure for trials which had run their full course, however, since the figure for regular trials does not include cases which ended in a settlement or directed verdict after the defendant's case, and we wish to have the figures
as comparable as possible. There remains of course the difficulty that the actually
separated trials do not behave necessarily like trials selected at random for separation. But this error is likely to be small enough to be ignored here.
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the separation rule, would be left to the regular mode of trial.
And, consequently, we conclude that if the separation rule were
applied liberally the overall time saving would not reach 20 per
cent but only (.9o X

20 =)

i8 per cent.

VII
With this we reach the end of our efforts to measure the amount
of trial time saved through separation. The remainder of this
essay is concerned with factors that could conceivably operate in
the opposite direction, increasing the court's burden of trial time."0
The most obvious one might be that the amount of time needed
for the jury's deliberation in separated cases- where the jury
may deliberate twice -may be greater than in regular trials.
Second, separation could conceivably reduce the number of jury
waivers, increasing the proportion of the more time-consuming
"6Before proceeding, it is necessary to report on two minor housekeeping details. One concerns the court's use of impartial medical experts; the other, our
treatment of 13 cases in which only the damage issue was tried because liability

was stipulated.
At the time the separation rule was introduced the court put into effect another
innovation. The judges in their discretion were enabled to appoint an impartial
medical expert if the adversary experts were too far apart. Since it could be argued
that such experts could affect trial time and, hence, our analysis, we give herewith
the relevant data. They carry the strong suggestion that these experts, whatever
their effect, did not distort our analysis of trial separation. Fourteen per cent of
the separated trials, and 8 per cent of the regular trials, had such experts. The
average length of these trials was 2.5 days for the separated and 5.3 for the regular
trials. There is thus no significant deviation from the general pattern. In any event,
as we have pointed out elsewhere, the primary effect of the impartial expert is
likely to be his increasing the likelihood of settlement before trial. DELAY X22-24.
Concerning the 13 cases with stipulated liability, the question had to be answered
as to whether these stipulations would have taken place if the separation rule had
not existed. Defense counsel might have simply preferred not to let the jury know
just how negligent his client had been. For purposes of our statistics we treated
the cases as follows: If the judge separated the issues, we assumed that admission
of liability was in response to the separation order. Out of the x3 cases where
liability was admitted, 3 fell into this category. The remaining io cases were
counted among the regular trials, under the assumption that here liability would
have been admitted even if the case had reached trial prior to the adoption of
the separation rule. This treatment probably concedes less influence to the separation rule than it deserves. The io cases, treated as regular trials, represent (io out
of 117 =) 99 of all regular trials. Although we have no statistics on such cases
for the time prior to the rule's adoption, it seems unlikely -and the judges have
confirmed this in their conferences with us - that this percentage was as high
as that. We probably err, therefore, by crediting only 3 cases of admitted
liability to the separation rule. This error will tend to make the average trial
time for regular cases shorter, and for the separated case longer, than it actually
was; hence, it probably causes us to underestimate the savings attributable to separation.
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trials before juries. 7 Third, separation might increase the number of hung juries, and hence the number of cases that have to be
tried twice. 18 Fourth, separation might reduce the proportion of
cases settled prior to trial, 9 and thereby increase the number of
cases that need to be tried. The suspicion that separation of issues
may lead to an overall slackening of trial speed has already been
laid to rest, especially by Table 2, which showed that the separated
trials that go to two verdicts do not last longer than full regular
trials. We turn now to the investigation of the possible offsets
enumerated above.
A. Increased Time for Jury Deliberation?
The first point is, in any event, one of relatively minor importance, since jury deliberation time is not necessarily court time.
Nevertheless, it will be of interest to see the pertinent figures in
the following table.

AVERAGE

JuRY

TABLE 7
Tim

DELIBERATION

Deliberation
Time

Separated Trials
Liability Issue
Damage Issue
Total
Regular Trials
Both Issues

X

AND FREQUENCY
Per Cent of
Trials in
Which Jury
Deliberated

Weighted
Average

=

2.7 hours a
3.4 hours

717o
127

hours
hours
2.33 hours

3.7 hours

73%

2.70 hours

1.92

0.41

. This is the average figure for all trials. In trials where the jury actually

deliberated twice, it took only

2.2

hours for the jury to affirm liability.

Thus we see that the jury in separated trials, if it deliberates
twice, spends an average of (3.4 + 2.2 =) 5.6 hours in the jury
room as against an average of only 3.7 hours in regular trials. This
could be an offset, except that in only 12 per cent of the separated
trials the jury was called upon to deliberate twice. 0 The last column of the table takes into account the frequency of deliberation,
giving an average deliberation time for all cases, including those
"I See Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example

of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 831, 851 (i96i).
1 See 74 HARv. L. REV. 781, 782 (Ig6i).
19

See Weinstein, supra note 17, at 85o.

"'See Table 6, p. 1617 supra.
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in which the jury deliberated only once or not at all. With deliberation time thus weighted, the effect of separation is favorable rather than unfavorable; the table reveals that the jury
spends on the average 0.37 hours, or about 22 minutes, less deliberation time in the average separated trial.
B. DecreasingFrequency of Jury Waivers?
On the second point, the frequency of jury waivers, the evidence is equally reassuring. There is no ground for believing
that the proportion of demands for juries increases under the
separation rule; in fact the evidence seems to point the other way,
though the difference is negligible. During the two-year period
before separation, juries were used in go per cent of all personal
injury cases; 21 during the corresponding period after separation,
in only 86 per cent.2 2 Furthermore, if separation were to reduce
jury waivers, one would expect the judges who are more likely
to order separation to show a lower incidence of jury waivers.
But Table 8, which presents the relevant data, shows no evidence
to this effect.
TABLE 8
SEPRATION RATIO AND JURY WAIVER IN
PERSONAL INJURY TsIALS
Per Cent of Cases
Tried Under Rule 21

Per Cent
Waiver

Number of
Trials Before
This Judge a

A
B
C
D
E

82

21

(33)

53
45
36

9
9
16

(45)

29

0

F
G

17
14
II

17
14

Judge

H
I
1
K
L

(II)

(3i)
(7)
(6)
(7)

i8
i8

(27)

6
7

0

(I4)

o
o

o
o

(I)
(I)

(33)

These separation ratios differ from those in Table 4 because they are based on
all trials conducted by this judge, not only on his jury trials.

C. Increase in Hung Juries?
As to the third possible offset against the savings achieved in
trial time, a possible increase in the number of hung juries, they
21

Statistics supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

22 From Table i, p. 16o9 supra; i86 is 86% of 2x6.
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are as rare an event now as they were prior to the new rule. 3
But even without such specific evidence it would seem unlikely
that any major offset could be expected from this source. Even
if the ordinary 3 per cent rate of mistrials had been doubled under
the new rule (which it was not), the offsetting loss of trial time
would be only about 1.5 per cent, since a hung jury is a total loss
only in about half of all instances; in the other half the litigants
take the jury's hint and settle, so that there is no need for a retrial.
D. Decreasein Settlement Ratio?

On the fourth issue, the settlement ratio, the evidence is given
in Table 9, which shows that the proportion of cases reaching
trial has not changed at all.
TABLE 9
SETTLEMENT RATIO IN JURY CASES BEFORE AND AFTER RULE 21
Two-Year Period Before
Separation

Two-Year Period With
Separation

Number

Per Cent

Number

Per Cent

1218
217

84.9%
15.17

1217
216

84.9%

Reached Trial
Total Personal Injury Jury
Cases Filed

1435

oo.o7

1433

ioo.o%

Disposed Before Trial

15.-%

That the separation rule is not likely to affect the settlement
ratio can also be appreciated on a priori grounds. The likelihood
that parties will settle is not a function of the relative strengths
of their positions, but rather of the clarity with which each sees
the other's position, since a settlement arises when each party
can weigh the other's chances and agree with him on what those
chances are. Whatever possible difference the rule could make
to the verdict expectation of the litigants, there is no reason to
believe that such a difference would be more visible to one side
than to the other. We should expect, therefore, that any possible
difference would leave the litigants as likely, or as unlikely, to
settle as they had been before.24
23 Unfortunately there are no precise court statistics available on the frequency

of hung juries. But our inquiries with both judges and clerks yielded complete
consensus on the insignificance of hung juries in this context.
"4Compare the analysis of an analogous problem: Interest From the Day of
Accident, DELAY 128-40.
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VIII

Although our inquiry has taken us far afield and into several
side forays, the task has been a narrow one -to measure the
effect of separation of issues on the court's trial load. This then
is a summary of our findings:
Separation of issues will save, on the average, about 20 per
cent of the time that would be required if these cases were tried
under traditional rules. This saving derives from the fact that
in many cases separation makes the litigation of damages unnecessary. This group includes all cases in which liability is denied, but also the majority of cases in which liability is affirmed,
because two out of three of these cases are likely to be settled
without trial of the damage issue. There is no evidence that this
saving is offset by a change in the settlement ratio prior to trial,
in the frequency of jury waivers, or in the proportion of hung
juries, any one of which factors-

if affected-

could increase

the court's trial load.
It is not possible to sort out effectively in advance the cases in
which separation would prove futile. Therefore, if a court wants
to realize the maximum of potential time saving through separation, it should separate as frequently as possible. The time saved
will be in direct proportion to the frequency of separations. Such
a policy recommends itself also on the ground that separation is
unlikely ever to add substantial trial time even if cases should go,
as some do, to a second verdict. If a court were to follow Judge
A's example and order separation routinely unless cause is shown
to the contrary, it could expect separation in about go per cent of all
cases. On this level of separation the overall saving could be expected to amount to roughly 18 per cent of the court's trial time.
Viewed superficially, the route which took us to this result
might seem overlong. Yet such is the nature of the social sciences
that, short of a controlled experiment, all their evidence is imperfect; only through a variety of converging approaches can one
hope to reach safe ground. 25 But from our investigation we have
learned that separation is a powerful remedy for court congestion. Fully used, it would be equivalent to increasing the number
of judges trying those cases by one-fifth. Cases which, if not
separated, will require five judges for their disposition will, if
separated, require only four judges and free one for other work.
The introduction of the separation rule, as we had occasion to
15 Cf. Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The Ideal and the Practical,in LAw
A

SoCoI.oGY X24-43 (Evan ed. x962), especially p. X26.
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observe, raised other questions beyond its efficacy as a delay remedy. These questions concern the possible effect of separation
on the substance of the jury verdicts. By depriving the jury of
its joint verdict, it is argued, subtle influences operate to affect
the verdict, and should therefore be included in an overall appraisal of the rule. We are now in the process of collecting data
which might have a bearing on this problem; if findings prove
significant, they will appear in a subsequent report.
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